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ABSTRACT 
While the Coalition Government was in power in Australia from 1996 to 2007, new 
immigrants have had to face tougher selection criteria and increased financial pressure. 
Most studies so far have overlooked the issue of the quality of the jobs obtained by new 
immigrants to Australia and whether the policy change has contributed to improve or 
worsen job quality among immigrants and their ability to move upward. Job quality is 
thought to be related to the channels of information used by immigrants in their job 
search. Some studies suggest that jobs found via networks of same origin migrants are 
of lower quality. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we investigate the effect of time 
since settlement on the ability of migrants to better their labour market outcomes. 
Second, we quantify the relationships between job quality and migrants’ job search 
methods and test whether they were affected by the policy changes. 
Using the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Australia (LSIA), we estimate the 
probabilities for immigrants to find “good jobs”, controlling for their initial 
employability upon arrival in Australia. We test several models involving various 
definitions of “good job”, from objective conditions, based on the nature and status of 
the occupation, to more subjective conditions based on job satisfaction. We show that 
the sole effect of being a second cohort migrant is beneficial for the probability to both 
find a job and a “good job” within the first year and half after settlement. After this 
time, cohort two migrants who still have not found a good job experience more 
difficulty to improve. Moreover, informal channels of information on job prospects 
have been slightly more efficient in enabling second cohort migrants to find good jobs, 
even though they still provide individuals with a disadvantage compared to formal 
channels.  
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1. Introduction 
The process of migration is associated with downward occupational mobility due 
to the migrants’ country-specific human capital being imperfectly transferable to 
the host country and/or as a consequence of poor language proficiency (Bauer and 
Zimmermann 1999). Studies in a wide range of institutional contexts have 
described migrants’ labour market outcomes in the host country has a U-shaped 
pattern of occupational mobility (Chiswick et al., 2002a) whereby drops in 
occupation observed early on after settlement are followed by a phase of recovery 
after some time spent in the host country (see Chiswick 1979; Duleep and Regets 
1996; Bauer and Zimmermann 1999; Chiswick et al. 2002b). The recovery stage 
takes up to a decade, after which the average migrant’s occupation and earnings 
are comparable to that of natives while a wealth gap remains for longer (Bauer et 
al., 2007).  
 Changes in immigration policies in the host country are likely to impact on 
the quality of the immigrant intakes as it is precisely their stated objective. In the 
more specific case of Australia, the policy changes observed in 1996 were 
directed at improving the employability of the new migrants while decreasing 
their reliance on the welfare system. Since 1996, new immigrants have had to face 
tougher selection criteria and increased financial pressure. Notably, the policy 
changes involved increased tightness in the selection criteria used by the 
Department of Immigration and the introduction of a two years waiting period for 
non-refugees before accessing social security benefits (Chiswick and Miller, 
2006). This change has probably led to stronger self selection among prospective 
migrants towards better employability for the later waves of migration. Recent 
studies conducted, notably by Cobb-Clark (2000, 2003), Richardson et al. (2001, 
2002) and Thapa and Gørgens (2006), have indeed shown that immigrants 
arriving after the policy change experienced higher probabilities of employment 
and found jobs earlier. However, the latter study points out that these better labour 
market outcomes are mostly due to better macroeconomic conditions in Australia 
rather than being solely due to the tightening up of the selection criteria. 
 While the policy changes seem to have somewhat impacted on the 
characteristics of new migrants with a significant increase in their ability to find a 
job, it is worth having a closer look to the type of jobs they obtained as compared 
to migrants subjected to the old policy. We can suspect that the policy also 
affected the size of migrants’ occupational drop on settlement as well as the pace 
of their recovery. Theoretically, two opposite effects of the policy may determine 
migrants’ labour market outcomes in terms of job quality. On the one hand, the 
tougher selection criteria have lead to ‘higher quality’ migrant intakes. Therefore, 
even if the eligibility to welfare payments had not been altered, new migrants 
would have relied less on them in the early stages of settlement. Moreover, their 
education, training and language ability should have lead them to get better jobs 
and recover faster from the initial shock on job quality. On the other hand, the two 
years waiting period before access to social security benefits would have 
decreased individuals’ reservation wages. In other words, the larger participation 
of later waves of migration could also be due to individuals’ willingness to accept 
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job offers that are inferior to their prior training or their former (or intended) 
occupation. Therefore, the restriction of welfare payments would have had a 
negative effect on job quality. Using the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to 
Australia (LSIA), Junankar and Mahuteau (2005) showed that job quality 
(measured on objective characteristics) is indeed inferior in the early stages of 
settlement for migrants arriving after the policy changes. Therefore, the second 
effect seems to be dominant on arrival.  However, there still is scent evidence as 
to whether migrants arriving after the policy changes overcome their initial job 
quality disadvantage and whether their higher ability allows them to move faster 
to better jobs. 
 In this paper we extend our first analysis and investigate the effect of time 
since settlement on the ability of migrants to better their labour market outcomes 
and the indirect impact the policy change may have had on job quality notably by 
altering migrants’ job search methods and their effectiveness. One shortcoming of 
our first study is that it focuses solely on migrants’ labour market outcomes up to 
6 months after arrival and therefore does not address the issue of occupational 
mobility beyond the mere comparison between the last job held in the former 
country and the first job obtained in Australia. Since the conclusion of our first 
analysis is that the policy change lead to a slight drop in (objective) job quality the 
question we address now is whether it produced lasting effects onto migrants’ 
occupational patterns.  
 We suggest that migration policies relying on welfare payments eligibility 
cut backs may have unintended effects on individuals which may offset the 
benefits from selecting higher ability migrants. Two related categories of 
arguments may be advanced for why this should be so. First, the two years 
waiting period before welfare transfers eligibility increased the opportunity cost of 
time spent searching for better jobs as well as the cost of furthering and adapting 
one’s human capital to the Australian labour market. Therefore, some individuals 
who started as underemployed in their first job may remain so for longer.  Second, 
job search methods have been affected by the policy changes towards a stronger 
reliance on informal channels of information on job prospects, more specifically 
family, friends and ethnic networks (Junankar and Mahuteau, 2005, 2008). Such 
informal sources are found to be important in procuring new migrants’ with jobs 
(Montgomery 1991; Yamauchi and Tanabe 2006). Incumbent migrants relay 
information about job prospects and may provide direct assistance via referrals, 
hence decreasing the search costs. While such informal sources of information 
may have the virtue of enabling new migrants to find jobs faster, their impact on 
job quality is rather unclear. For well defined measures of job quality such as the 
level of wages, evidences are contradictory as to whether earnings are 
significantly improved by the help of incumbent migrants. For example, Munshi 
(2003) finds positive effects  for Mexican migrants while Loury (2003) and Elliott 
(1999) find that social networks have a negative effect for some jobs, especially 
those involving low skills. It is also observed that incumbents’ help is usually 
unidirectional; from higher skilled individuals to lower skilled new migrants, that 
is lower skilled jobs (Stark and Wang, 2000). Moreover, it appears that jobs found 
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through ‘friends’ and ‘acquaintances’ have often little connection  with the 
individual’s previous experience or training (Ottaviano and Peri, 2006). This 
occurs because new migrants using informal sources are dependent on the 
composition of their network which is mostly determined by family, 
neighbourhood or ethnic ties rather than by professional affiliations. In that, they 
differ from natives who can sample assistance from a larger base, including so 
called ‘old boys networks’ (Simon and Walker, 1992). As evidence of this, 
Yamauchi and Tanabe’s study of the Bangkok market (2006) shows that the 
success of new migrants who rely on previous migrants in their job search 
depends on how successful the latter are themselves. New migrants have a limited 
number of individuals to sample their information from and there is a positive 
correlation between their personal contacts’ labour market outcome and their own. 
 These evidences point towards a negative effect of informal sources on 
migrants’ job quality. However, the ‘social networks’ literature  makes it clear 
that the relative effectiveness of job search based on informal methods compared 
to formal ones depends largely on the indicators used for assessing job quality, but 
also on institutional context, demographic characteristics and on the nature of the 
ties linking individuals (Barber, 1998; Ioannides and Loury, 2004; Marsden and 
Gorman, 2001). Therefore, on the migrants’ standpoint, one would expect the 
relative effectiveness of job search methods to be significantly altered by major 
events such as changes in the immigration policy. This paper presents a first 
attempt  to quantify the relationship between information channels and migrants’ 
job quality. Furthermore, we investigate to what extent these relations changed 
after 1996. More specifically we look at whether informal sources lead to better 
jobs for migrants arriving after the policy change or not. 
 We develop an econometric model aimed at testing the effect of the duration 
of stay on migrants’ ability to find good jobs and the impact immigration policy 
changes may have had on individuals’ occupational mobility. We further test 
whether informal channels of information on job prospects lead to significantly 
lower job quality and to what extent the return to the various job search channels 
have been altered after the policy changes. 
 The data used in this paper are from the Longitudinal Surveys of 
Immigrants to Australia (LSIA) conducted by the Department of Immigration. We 
adopt a bivariate Probit specification, controlling first for immigrants’ 
employability upon entering Australia and, second, investigating the ease with 
which they obtain good jobs. In other words, we estimate the migrants’ 
probabilities to find a “good job”, given they actually find a job. Data from the 
LSIA offers the advantage of being composed of two cohorts of immigrants 
having settled in Australia before (cohort 1) and after (cohort 2) the policy 
changes, each of them involving several waves of interviews (3 for cohort 1, and 2 
for cohort 2) spanning from 10 days after arrival to up to 4 years.1 Contrary to our 
                                                 
1 Each waves of interview is intended to survey Immigrants within 6 months, 18 months and 24 
months after arrival. However, there are large variations in the actual time immigrants have been 
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first study (Junankar and Mahuteau, 2005) which looked at labour market 
outcomes shortly after arrival, we now focus on the effect of time on migrants’ 
ability to find good jobs and explicitly take into account their job search methods.  
 We test several models, involving several definitions of what constitutes a 
“good job”, from objective conditions, based on the nature of the occupations and 
their social status rank, to more subjective conditions, where the focus shifts to the 
individuals’ satisfaction with their current main job and/or whether they intend to 
search for better occupations in the near future. 
 Our main results show that the sole effect of being a second cohort migrant 
is beneficial for the probability to both find a job and a “good job”. They are more 
likely to move upward earlier than first cohort migrants. However, a large part of 
this result is due to the higher employability of second cohort migrants. As a 
consequence, they outperform first cohort migrants but only up to about a year 
and half after settlement. After this, cohort 2 migrants who have not found a good 
job yet see their prospect of improving their situation decrease sharply below that 
of first cohort individuals. Therefore, even though migrants arriving after the 
policy change are indeed of slightly better quality, those who do not land a good 
job quickly have to wait longer before experiencing a significant upward 
occupational mobility. 
 Regarding the effect of the sources of information on the current main job 
found by individuals, one observes that alternative channels to using the 
Australian (English language) press, including informal channels, contribute to 
increasing the probability to find a job. Individuals investigating the labour market 
on the sole basis of the Australian press, which can be approximated as the formal 
channel through which natives find job offers, are on average worse off in terms 
of finding a job. As regards job quality, informal job search techniques lead to 
lower job quality. However, second cohort migrants who use those informal 
channels seem to use it more efficiently as it contributes to reduce the differential 
with the formal channel. For example, while people who use friends and family 
are respectively around 18 percent and 23 percent worse off in terms of job 
quality, second cohort migrants using the same channel improve their probability 
of having a good job by respectively 3 percent and 7 percent. Altogether, informal 
channels have been slightly more efficient in enabling second cohort migrants to 
find a good job, even though they still provide individuals with a disadvantage 
compared to formal channels. 
2. Literature review 
Cobb-Clark (2000, 2003) and Richardson et al. (2001, 2002) have explored 
various aspects of the settlement of migrants in Australia. These papers compare 
the first LSIA cohort with the first wave of the second LSIA cohort and come to 
the conclusion that the migrants are more likely to be employed in the second 
                                                                                                                                     
in Australia at the moment of each wave of interview. This explains why some immigrants have 
actually been in Australia for almost 4 years when answering the third interview. 
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cohort compared to the first cohort, that they are less likely to be unemployed, etc. 
and suggest that this is due to a combination of the tightening up of the selection 
criteria between the two cohorts and because of the limited access to social 
security benefits for the second cohort. Cobb-Clark (2003) estimates an equation 
for the participation decision, an equation for unemployment (conditional on 
being in the labour force), and an equation for the duration in months looking for 
work after arrival in Australia until the interview date. The first two equations are 
estimated by Probit methods while the third equation is estimated by Ordinary 
Least Squares. The results show that females from the second cohort have higher 
participation rates and lower unemployment rates, and spend less time 
unemployed. In contrast, there are no significant differences for males between 
the first and second cohorts in terms of the coefficients on the independent 
variables: the higher participation rates and lower unemployment rates are due to 
different human capital characteristics. The conclusions of the study are that the 
better performance of the second cohort is primarily due to the tightening of the 
selection criteria and the composition of the migrants in terms of the visa 
categories. In particular, it should be noted that the paper was based on the first 
Wave of each cohort, that is, after the migrants had been in Australia for only 
about six months. 
 Thapa and Gørgens (2006) explore the duration of unemployment of 
migrants using the LSIA data. They find that migrants in the second cohort had a 
shorter duration of unemployment before finding their first job compared to 
migrants in the first cohort. In their paper, they point out data problems as the 
LSIA did not ask for a calendar diary of events so there are some problems of 
finding out when the first job was actually begun. They also study the different 
methods of job search and find that “friends” were the most important source for 
finding their first job. They estimate hazard function models (semi-parametric 
Cox model and fully parameterised Weibull model) for the duration to find the 
first job. The results are similar to many other results in that migrants with visas 
as Independent migrants or Business Skills migrants had a shorter duration, 
English-speaking migrants and European migrants had higher probabilities of 
finding their first job, while the results for education are mixed. Migrants with 
trade qualifications are more likely to find a job compared to those with a 
Bachelors degree. The results also suggest that the reason for the second cohort to 
have better employment probabilities was due to the better macroeconomic 
conditions prevailing in Australia rather than due to the tighter selection criteria 
for the second cohort. 
 Chiswick and Miller (2004) study the role of ethnic networks in the United 
States of America in the geographical location of migrants. They find that there is 
a significant concentration of ethnic groups, especially greater amongst those 
migrants who do not use English at home. Yamauchi and Tanabe (2006) study the 
role of non market networks among migrants in Bangkok, Thailand and find that 
there are economies of scale in information networks and that the higher the 
proportion of the earlier migrants that are employed, the greater the advantage for 
newer migrants. 
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 In an earlier paper, Junankar and Mahuteau (2005) looked at the probability 
of migrants finding their first job, and whether it was a good job, using the LSIA 
data sets for the first and second cohorts. They defined a job as good if it meets 
the following objective conditions: firstly, that the employees are using their 
existing qualifications in their current job, and that their occupational ranking is 
the same or better. The subjective definition we use is that: s/he likes their job, 
wants to stay in the same job, and holds only one job. They found that, in general, 
there was a significant difference between the first and second cohorts: the LSIA 
2 cohort was less likely to hold a good job after controlling for education, visa 
category, etc. In the present paper we extend this study to using the panel data set 
and compare the behaviour over time. 
3. Data 
The Longitudinal Surveys of Immigrants to Australia provide a rich source of data 
to analyse the settlement issues of new migrants in Australia. An important 
difference from most other data sets on migrants is that the LSIA provides 
information on the visa category under which the migrants arrived in Australia. 
This is clearly very important as people who may have come to Australia as 
refugees or as family migrants would have more difficulty in entering the labour 
market compared to economic migrants who have been assessed on a points 
system that gives higher points to those with higher levels of education and higher 
skills and in occupations that are looking for employees.  
 There have been two cohorts for whom data have been collected by the 
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (as it is now called). The first cohort 
entered Australia between September 1993 and August 1995 and the second 
cohort entered between September 1999 and August 2000. The first cohort was 
interviewed three times: 6 months after arrival (Wave 1), 18 months after arrival 
(Wave 2), and 42 months after arrival (Wave 3). The second cohort was 
interviewed only twice: 6 months after arrival (Wave 1) and 18 months after 
arrival (Wave 2). The first cohort consisted of 6,960 primary applicants and their 
spouses and the second cohort consisted of 4,181 primary applicants and their 
spouses.2 In the first cohort there were 5,192 Principal Applicants (43.03 percent 
female) and in the second cohort there were 3,124 Principal Applicants (45.84 
percent female). This paper focuses on the labour market behaviour of Principal 
Applicants only. 
 Between the two cohorts there were several significant policy changes that 
probably affected the composition of the migrant intake and their behaviour after 
entering Australia. In particular, there were several changes in the selection 
procedure for entering Australia that, in effect, made it more difficult for family 
members to enter, a tightening of the points test and the English language test, and 
a decrease in the humanitarian (refugee) category. These changes are discussed in 
detail in Cobb-Clark (2003). These changes are likely to have affected the quality 
of migrants in terms of their human capital characteristics. In other words, the 
                                                 
2  Further details can be found in Cobb-Clark (2001). 
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second cohort of the LSIA is not strictly speaking comparable to the first cohort. 
The tightening up of entry conditions for family migrants could have affected the 
quality of potential applicants, especially if they came from cultures where an 
extended family is an important social group. 
 Another important change that took place was the eligibility for 
unemployment and other social security benefits. For the first cohort, migrants 
had a waiting period of six months before they became eligible for social security 
benefits (excluding the humanitarian category of migrants who had access to all 
benefits without a waiting period). For the second cohort, the waiting period had 
been increased to two years as well as the tightening up of procedures for access 
to these benefits. These changes are likely to have affected the decisions of the 
potential migrants on whether to apply to migrate to Australia. In addition, once 
they entered Australia the lack of access to social security benefits may affect the 
labour market behaviour of these migrants by influencing their reservation wage.  
4. Econometric model 
 We estimate migrants’ probabilities to find a good job in Australia. We are 
particularly interested in the difference between first and second cohort migrants 
regarding their ability to move to better occupations throughout time. Moreover, 
we suspect that the new policy may have altered the effectiveness of the various 
job search methods used by migrants. Since second cohort migrants use informal 
methods more intensively (Mahuteau and Junankar, 2008), we also explicitly take 
these search methods into account as determinants of the probability to find a 
good job. This enables to assess the relative effectiveness of informal job search 
through personal contacts compared to that of formal methods. Using difference-
in-difference estimators, we are also able to provide comparisons between cohort 
1 and cohort 2 migrants regarding the outcome they may expect from each job 
search method. 
  Everything else held constant, the premise that second cohort migrants are 
of better quality since the selection criteria have been tightened and thus should 
obtain better jobs than their predecessors may be offset by the added pressure 
bestowed upon them by the removal of social benefits for a period of two years 
after arrival in Australia. The new policy may have led new migrants of the 
second cohort to hastily accept lower quality jobs and may have altered their 
ability to switch to better jobs after some time spent in Australia. The absence of 
social security benefits in the settlement phase contributes to the decrease of the 
migrants’ reservation wages. We may expect that this would have lead to an 
increased labour supply and a comparatively smaller time allocation towards 
adapting one’s pre-existing human capital to the Australian context, thus delaying 
access to good jobs. If this hypothesis is true, we should observe a positive effect 
of belonging to the second cohort on the migrants’ probability to find a job in 
Australia but a negative effect on the subsequent job quality. Junankar and 
Mahuteau (2005) find such an effect when job quality is assessed on the basis of 
objective measures for migrants taken after 6 months of settlement in Australia. In 
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the present study, we take advantage of the longitudinal aspect of the LSIA data 
and aim at investigating whether time spent in Australia enables second cohort 
migrants to recover from their relative job quality disadvantage observed after 6 
months in Australia. Given that the second cohort migrants are demonstrated to 
have higher abilities (Cobb-Clark 2000), one may assume that with time, first and 
second cohort migrants’ job quality attainments should not display any significant 
difference or, if any, the advantage should go to the second cohort migrants.  
 One difficulty of our analysis is to come up with a satisfactory definition of 
job quality. As in Junankar and Mahuteau (2005), we use two sets of definitions, 
based on subjective and objective criteria. A first approach consists in attributing 
a good job to a migrant if she, herself, rates her current main job as a good job. 
We use this definition in the first model whereby the dependent variable is 
defined as taking value 1 if the migrant considers her job as a good job.3 
However, in order to give more impact on the individual’s own judgement about 
her job, we focus on the self rating satisfaction on the job for individuals who also 
state that their primary motivation for migrating to Australia was to benefit from 
better job opportunities. These individuals are more likely to make a less 
forgiving assessment of their current situation.  
 A number of issues arise from adopting job satisfaction as a definition for 
job quality. First, different macroeconomic conditions and availability of social 
transfers may alter what one judges as a good job. It is possible that a second 
cohort migrant with no access to any social safety net may consider herself lucky 
enough to have a job and would then rate her current main job higher than she 
would, had she had access to social benefits. A second issue pertains to the 
migrant’s actual reference when assessing the quality of her job. In the early 
stages of the settlement and for some time after migration, individuals are very 
likely to compare their current situation to the circumstances they used to face in 
their former country. Hence, we complement the first definition with a second 
subjective definition of job quality where we compare current main job 
satisfaction with the level of satisfaction on the last job held in the former country. 
Therefore the second dependent variable will take value 1 if job satisfaction on the 
current main job rates higher than (or the same as) in the former country.  
 The second set of dependent variables we use in the estimations adopt 
objective criteria to assess the quality of the jobs obtained by the new migrants. 
An obvious measure consists in comparing the individual’s occupation ranking 
from one wave to another and from the occupation held in the former country to 
the current main job. These objective definitions account for the improvement 
made by the migrants from their former country and throughout their stay in 
Australia rather than actually accounting for job quality per se. Migrants being a 
rather heterogenous group, it makes more sense to look at their improvements in 
terms of occupation. Previous studies show that migrants with higher ranked 
occupations in their former country suffer a larger downward shock upon 
                                                 
3 The dependent variable in that case has value 1 if the migrant loves her current main job “best 
job I have ever had” or likes it, “it is really a good job”. 
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settlement in the host country4 but tend to recover more rapidly than migrants at 
the lower end of the spectrum of occupations, even more so when the migrants 
considered are refugees. 
 According to our first objective definition, we consider a migrant as having 
a good job if her current main job in Australia is at least equivalent (in terms of 
ASCO5 2 digits) to the job held in the former country or to that held at the time of 
the previous interview. In other words, a migrant is considered as having a good 
job if she at least maintains the same occupation level or improves it. Given that 
an average migrant is expected to experience a drop on arrival, maintaining one’s 
occupation level can be considered as an achievement.  
 In spite of its relative objectivity, this definition also presents some 
shortcomings related to the relative inadequacy between the ASCO classification 
and the actual occupations’ socioeconomic ranking. Among various attempts at 
reconciling occupation ranking and socioeconomic status, McMillan and Jones 
(2000) offer a composite index that may be useful to assess job quality. The 
ANU3_2 synthetic scale integrates a number of relevant socioeconomic 
dimensions in order to give a more exhaustive assessment of the social status 
attached to each occupation as described by the ASCO. It takes into account the 
prestige, requirements (notably in terms of education), the rewards and power 
attached to the listed occupations. The ANU3 scale assigns a number between 0 
and 100 to the occupations classified under ASCO with the lowest score, 0.8, 
assigned to Railway Labourers (ASCO: 9915) and the highest score of 99.2 to 
Specialist Medical Practitioners (ASCO 2312). It is tied to the ASCO in that, on 
average, high ASCO numbers receive lower ANU3 score and vice versa. Yet 
noticeable crossings occur for occupations that are not too far apart in the ASCO 
classification. For example Importers and Exporters are ranked high in the ASCO 
scale (1190) but get a ANU3 score of only 41.9, which is lower than most of the 
ASCO 2000s and some of the 3000s. 
 Our second objective definition of job quality relies on the ANU3 
occupation status scale. We consider that a migrant obtains a good job if the social 
status associated to her current occupation is not less than her status in the former 
country and/or previous waves of interview. Using both subjective and objective 
definitions of job quality is useful not only because we cover a larger spectrum of 
quality measures but also because comparisons between the two broad categories 
are informative. Indeed, we can distinguish between what belongs to a migrant’s 
perception of her outcome (subjective) and her actual outcome (objective) and 
highlight potential discrepancies. 
 We added a last objective definition of job quality which only looks at 
improvements in terms of social ranking (ANU3_2 classification) from the origin 
country. According to this definition, a migrant has a good job if she obtains an 
occupation whose social ranking is at least equivalent to that of the job held last in 
the origin country. Comparing the results for this definition and the other 
                                                 
4 See Chiswick et al. (2002). 
5 ASCO stands for Australian Standard Classification of Occupations. 
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objective definitions enables to distinguish between improvements from the origin 
country alone and further progress once in Australia6.         
 We observe job quality (either subjective or objective) only for migrants 
holding a job, whether employed, self employed or business owner. Hence we 
define a two equation model where we first estimate the probability for the 
migrants to hold a job. Then, for those who do, we estimate the probabilities for 
their occupation to be a good job. In other words, we estimate the probability to 
have a good job conditional on being employed. We estimate a separate model for 
each definition of a good job. 
 The first equation not only serves a practical purpose of controlling for 
selection in the estimation of job quality but it also provides relevant information 
on migrants’ employability in Australia and how it may have been affected by the 
policy changes after 1997. Since the tightening up of the selection criteria affects 
second cohort migrants and aims at attracting better quality individuals, we expect 
to observe better employability for this cohort of the dataset. 
The model is described as follows (the subscripts are dropped for clarity):  
 * '2 2 2 2y Xβ ε= +            (1) 
where the observable counterpart of *2y  is 2 1y =  if '2 2 2Xε β> −  (and 2 0y =  
otherwise), the observation of whether the migrant has a job or not. 
* '
1 1 1 1y Xβ ε= +            (2) 
where 1 1y =  if '1 1 1Xε β> −  and 1 0y =  if '1 1 1Xε β≤ − , the observation of whether 
the migrant has a good job. The observation mechanism is such that 1y  is not 
observed if 2y  is zero. Furthermore, we assume that the disturbances follow a 
bivariate normal distribution with correlation coefficient ρ ; 
( ) ( )2 1, BVN 0,0,1,1,ε ε ρ∼ . 
 Ideally, this model should be estimated taking full advantage of the 
longitudinal nature of the LSIA dataset, that is, using panel estimates for the 
vectors of parameters, including random effects capturing time and individual 
effects. However, the majority of the exogenous variables available for the 
                                                 
6 Note that all definitions of good job except the first one entail a comparison to a given reference 
point starting from the occupation held in the former country. In other words, all these measures 
are expressed in relative terms. Yet, the results may be interpreted as if they were absolute 
measures for two reasons. First, we control for migrants’ employability in the econometric model. 
Second, the quality of second cohort migrants’ former occupations is not significantly different 
from that of first cohort individuals for a wide range of different measures considered. Yet, it 
would have been interesting to complement our estimations with absolute measures such as the 
level of wages. However, such information is available in the LSIA data as categorised variables. 
Given the relatively large size of the category intervals our analysis would not have been improved 
by adopting such a measure as dependent variable. 
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estimations display no or little time variance. The reason for this is that migrants 
are interviewed at most three and a half years after arriving in Australia (third 
wave) which is a relatively short period of time for one to observe important 
variations compared to Wave 1. Moreover, the exogenous variables used to 
estimate migrants’ labour market outcomes are mostly time invariant (individual 
characteristics, past experience and life in former country, etc.). To our 
knowledge, the body of research using the LSIA have recognized this 
shortcoming of the database and have tried to account for whatever relevant time 
variations by the use of dummies and interaction variables, namely by using 
difference in difference estimators to capture differences between two cohorts of 
individuals. We follow the same approach in the present study. The model tested 
may be described more specifically as: 
* ' ' '
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2y X Z C Wβ ε ζ δ ω ε= + = + + +      (3) 
* ' ' '
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1y X Z C Wβ ε ζ δ ω ε= + = + + +      (4) 
*
2 21 if 0,  0 otherwisey y= > , 
*
1 11 if 0,  0 otherwisey y= > , 
( ) ( )2 1, BVN 0,0,1,1,ε ε ρ∼ . 
Z is a matrix of individual characteristics such as those commonly encountered in 
migrants’ labour force participation estimations, namely age (in quadratic form), 
gender, marital status, visa category, education level, former occupation, English 
proficiency measures, time since arrival. We introduce a set of dichotomous 
variables indicating the origin of the migrant’s information concerning job 
opportunities. More specifically, we test whether friends, family and ethnic 
groups contribute to the new migrants’ labour market outcome both in terms of 
probability to find a job and ability to find a good job. Evidence indicates that 
incumbent migrants may facilitate the entry into the labour market of fellow 
country people, providing accommodation, information (Chiswick et al. 2001, 
Yamauchi and Tanabe 2006) or referrals (Montgomery 1991). However, they may 
also perceive new migrants as a potential competition.7 Other models suggest that 
highly skilled migrants tend to facilitate fellow migrants’ labour force 
participation but to lower skilled jobs. This would suggest that friends and 
acquaintances are instrumental in new migrants accessing the job market but may 
not be as helpful with respect to job quality. 
 C is a dummy variable allowing for different intercepts for second cohort 
migrants. W is a matrix of interaction variables allowing different slope 
coefficients for second cohort migrants and providing the difference in difference 
estimators of interest. We test two types of interaction terms. First we test whether 
migrants settling in Australia after the policy change do indeed find jobs more 
                                                 
7 See Heitmueller (2003); Yamauchi and Tanabe (2006). 
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(5) 
quickly but also whether it takes longer to land a good job. The added pressure to 
find a job for these individuals should lead to a significant and positive effect of 
the interaction term between cohort and time spent in Australia but should be 
significant and negative in the job quality equation if we accept the assumption 
that new migrants accept bad jobs first and do not move rapidly thereafter. Second 
we test a number of assumptions regarding immigrants’ use of alternative 
channels of information concerning job prospects in Australia. Namely, friends, 
acquaintances and family, while being a source of help in finding a first job given 
that more formal channels may be less accessible upon settlement in Australia, 
may prove to have a negative effect on the job quality. We test this assumption 
and check whether the effect of the information channels on job prospects affects 
first and second cohort migrants differently in a context where the latter have had 
larger recourse to these sources of information. 
 The use of a bivariate Probit allows us to account for the fact that some of 
the determinants of labour force participation may be different from those of the 
job quality without altering the identification of the model’s parameters. In other 
words, elements of 1Z  may be different from those of 2Z .  
 We estimate the probability for a migrant to obtain a good job given that she 
participates in the labour force (and is employed) by full information maximum 
likelihood methods. The corresponding optimal values of the parameters are then 
given by: 
( )
( ) ( )
2 1
1 2
2 1 2
' '
2 2 2 1 1
1, 1* * * *
' ' '
2 2 2 1 1 2 2
1, 0 0
log , ,
, , ,
log , , log
y y
j
y y y
X X
ArgMax
X X X
ε ε
β β ρ
β ρ σ σ β β ρ β
= =
= = =
⎡ ⎤Φ +⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤∈ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ Φ − − − Φ −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑
∑ ∑
 
The first two elements of the likelihood function account for the contributions to 
the likelihood of observations where migrants are employed and may have 
respectively a good or a bad job. The last element accounts for contributions to 
the likelihood made by unemployed migrants. The model is identified so long as 
there is at least one variable present in the first equation but excluded in the 
second. Our model fulfils this requirement since there is no reason to impose that 
the determinants of finding a job may be exactly the same as the factors 
influencing job quality.8 
 Because of the non linear nature of the model, the parameters obtained in 
this estimation do not represent the marginal effects of each variable on the 
conditional probability to obtain a good job. Several marginal effects may be 
computed since one can define several conditional means out of a bivariate Probit 
model. However, since one observes job quality only for individuals holding a 
                                                 
8 Since each equation involves both dummies and continuous variables, we have rescaled the latter 
type of variables in order to facilitate convergence of this rather unstable type of model. This 
method is traditionally in use in the literature. 
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job, we are mainly interested in the effect of each variable on the probability of 
holding a good job conditioned on being employed. 
Therefore, the joint probability, evaluated as 
( ) ( )' '1 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 11, 1 , , ,P y y X X X Xβ β ρ= = = Φ  is hardly of interest for us. The 
conditional probability from which we derive the marginal effects associated to 
the variables is then defined as: 
( ) ( )( )
' '
2 2 2 1 1
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 '
2 2
, ,
1, , 1 1, ,
X X
E y y X X P y y X X
X
β β ρ
β
Φ⎡ ⎤= = = = =⎣ ⎦ Φ   (6)  
 A number of issues arise in the computation of the marginal effects due to 
the nature of the variables used in the equations of the model. For continuous 
variables such as age, time spent in Australia, etc., the computation is relatively 
straightforward9. Since the marginal effects vary with the values taken by the 
variables composing the model, our results usually report marginal effects 
evaluated at the sample means of the variables, unless otherwise stated. 
 For dummy variables, evaluating marginal effects at their sample mean is 
meaningless since these variables are binary. The marginal effects are then 
computed as the difference between the estimated conditional probability for a 
dummy variable d set to 1 and the same conditional probability when the dummy 
is set to 0, that is,10 
 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1, ,
1, , , 1 1, , , 0
E y y X X
E y y X X d E y y X X d
d
⎡ ⎤Δ =⎣ ⎦ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= = = − = =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦Δ  
A larger issue arises for the computation of the marginal effects of interaction 
terms outlined in the matrix , 1, 2jW j =  in the model. We extensively use these 
variables in order to capture the differential effects associated with the 
characteristics of the second cohort’s individuals as opposed to first cohort 
migrants who came under different migration policies. If we denote by ik i ikw C z=  
an interaction variable used in any of the , 1, 2jW j =  matrices and C the dummy 
indicating the cohort to which a given migrant i belongs, the marginal effect 
associated with the interaction variable kw  can be expressed as: 
 
 
 
 
with 1 2X X X= ∪   
                                                 
9 See Greene (1996). 
10 Standard errors are recomputed accordingly using the delta method. 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
' '
2 2 2 1 1 1'1 2 1 2
1 1 1 12
' ' '2
1 1 1 2 2 2 2'
2 2 2 2 2'2
2
(2 1) (2 1)1, , (2 1)
11
' (2 1) (2 1)
(2 1) .
1
k
y X y XE y y X X y X
w
XC y X y X X
y X
X
β ρ βφ β γρ
γ β ρ β φ γφ β γγρ
⎡ ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− − −⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤∂ = ⎢ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟− ΦΔ⎜ ⎟ ⎢ ⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ −∂ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ⎢ ⎢ ⎥=Δ ⎢ ⎥ΦΔ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞− − −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟+ − Φ −Φ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥Φ−⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎣
C
⎤⎥⎥⎥ Δ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎦
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The tables of results incorporate the estimated marginal effects for each variable 
using the appropriate computations involved by the nature of the variables as 
described above.  
5. Results 
Table 1 summarizes the marginal effects obtained for each model involving an 
objective definition of job quality while Table 2 offers the same computation for 
the subjective definitions. The figures presented are such that we decompose the 
marginal effects of each variable between their direct effect (on job quality) and 
their indirect effect via the probability to find a job. The total effect of each 
variable on the conditional probability to find a good job is the sum of the two 
marginal effects (if the considered variable is used in both equations). Interpreting 
the decomposition of these marginal effects is useful since we may observe some 
determinants which affect both dependent variables in opposite directions. This 
decomposition is definitely relevant for our purpose since we want to test the 
hypothesis that second cohort migrants are likely to find a first job more quickly 
than earlier migrants but may hold a bad job longer. 
 Whether one analyses the objective or subjective definitions retained for job 
quality, the results are fairly similar with few exceptions for definitions related to 
direct comparisons between labour market outcomes in the former country and in 
Australia. All the definitions focusing on the individuals’ improvements once in 
Australia produce comparable marginal effects for each variable in the good job 
estimations. The traditional trilogy of tests (LM, LR, Wald) were conducted in 
order to check the hypothesis that all coefficients are null in each model. For all 
models, we comfortably reject this hypothesis. Moreover, tests of the hypothesis 
that the residuals of both equations are uncorrelated ( 0ρ = ) was overwhelmingly 
rejected for all models, hence justifying the bivariate structure of our estimations. 
 Regarding the selection equation on the probability to find a job in 
Australia, the estimates only differ marginally from one model to another which is 
desirable and to be expected.  
5.1 Probability to have a job in Australia 
The results of this first step corroborate earlier studies by Junankar and Mahuteau 
(2005), Cobb-Clark (2000), Richardson et al. (2000, 2001). Namely, higher levels 
of education are beneficial to the probability to find a job. Immigrants with a 
bachelor degree (or higher) experience about 6 percent extra probability to find a 
job upon arrival compared to someone who only completed HSC or equivalent. 
Tests11 of equality of the marginal effects obtained for each education variable are 
all rejected with a probability of error lower than 0.1 percent and imply the 
superiority of holding a bachelor degree over any other education level on the 
probability to find a job. Moreover, whether immigrants have only completed 
                                                 
11 All the tests performed in this paper, which involved comparisons of the estimates of the 
marginal effects were systematically done using LM, LR and Wald tests conjointly. 
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primary or secondary school does not significantly alter their employment 
probability. Noticeably, individuals with a Technical degree are 2 percent less 
likely to find a job, though the effect is weak. 
 As commonly observed in previous studies, migrant’s age has a quadratic 
effect on the probability to find a job. Moreover females are much worse off than 
males with an average probability 15 percent lower than males. This is a relatively 
strong result since we control for visa status, notably family reunion visa. Marital 
status gives an advantage to non married individuals in their ability to find a job. 
 The visa status and English proficiency play an important role in the ability 
to find a job. Refugees experience a much tougher situation on the labour market 
compared to any other visa categories, even family reunion visas, being up to 30 
percent less likely to find a job than individuals entering under the points system. 
In addition, people coming from a non English speaking background country are 
almost 10 percent worse off and so are individuals who were unemployed in their 
former country. 
 The results obtained on the information channels used by immigrants to find 
a job highlight much better performances associated with more informal and 
ethnic network based sources of information than through the use of the English 
speaking press. Family and friends take an active part in providing immigrants 
with adequate information to find their first job, more so than if they tried to use 
channels commonly utilized by natives. A further analysis aimed at testing the 
equality of the marginal effects associated with the friends and family led to 
accept the hypothesis that they are not significantly different. This result brings 
further evidence to earlier studies stressing the role of family and earlier migrants 
originating from the same country in the new migrants’ positive labour market 
outcome (Chiswick et al. 2002a and 2002b) and justifies the existence of local 
agglomeration of migrants of the same ethnicity. Noticeably, immigrants who rely 
on information provided by the government are more likely to find a job than if 
they had used any other channel. The superiority of the marginal effect attached to 
government agencies is statistically significant. 
 The effect of being a second cohort migrant is captured not only through the 
variable Cohort but also by interaction variables crossing cohort and a number of 
variables deemed to have their effect altered because of the policy change 
incurred by the second cohort migrants. At first our estimations involved further 
interaction variables with visa status as we expected refugees to fare even worse 
since the policy change.12 However, none of the marginal effects associated with 
these variables were significant both for the employment and good job equations. 
This result is not that surprising given that we control in large part for immigrants’ 
characteristics. 
 A crucial variable in the assessment of the cohort effect is the interaction 
between time spent in Australia and cohort. Interestingly, these interaction effects 
are not significant in the job equations, indicating that second cohort migrants do 
                                                 
12 Results available on demand. 
 15 
not experience an acceleration of their ability to find a job after arrival in 
Australia. They simply keep their initial advantage of about 6 percent upon 
settlement. This result may indicate that second cohort migrants have benefited 
from the better macroeconomic conditions prevailing in Australia at the time. 
There may also be a residual effect attached to the quality of the later migration 
cohort that is not captured by the observable characteristics, but it should be minor 
since we control for visa categories, education and labour market outcomes in the 
former country. About the latter variable, we observe that immigrants who not 
only participated in the labour force in their former country but who also had an 
activity for which they received payment (as a business owner or a salary earner) 
are about 10 percent more likely to find a job in Australia. Altogether, if we use 
the estimates of the marginal effects of time to describe immigrants’ probability 
profiles, we observe that they reach a maximum in their employment probability 
in the vicinity of three years after arrival. Note however, that these out-of-sample 
simulations can only be taken as very rough approximations of the actual, 
unknown, probability profiles. 
 In the following Section, we analyse the estimations of job quality for both 
cohort migrants. 
 
5.2 Probability to have a good job in Australia 
The first striking result which corroborates earlier studies is that University 
graduates (and those with higher qualifications) seem to experience a larger 
negative shock on the quality of their first jobs than other, less educated 
individuals. Since part of an individual’s human capital is not fully transferable to 
a new country, those more endowed before migration are bound to experience a 
larger loss upon settlement in the host country. Therefore, this result is not 
surprising. Besides, we tested whether there exists a cohort effect related to 
education but found none which suggests that the policy change has not 
substantially altered the returns to education. Furthermore, when job quality is 
based on objective criteria, university graduates seem to experience a larger initial 
negative shock than if job quality is assessed through individuals’ own judgment. 
Further tests show that this difference is statistically significant (at a 1 percent 
level) which suggests a somewhat biased self assessment from the immigrants.  
 Since the third model is restricted to job quality comparisons between 
former country and Australia and both model 1 and 2 look at the progression in 
Australia, the difference between the two marginal effects may be interpreted as 
evidence that in further jobs, University graduates only marginally improve their 
situation. Recovery must intervene in later jobs than those observed after 24 
months upon settlement (which is the limit in the sample). This is corroborated by 
the analysis of the time variables below. Altogether, we observe that the marginal 
effect for University degree obtained in model 3 (objective definition) is not 
statistically different from those obtained in the models involving subjective 
definitions. This result may suggest that up to 24 months after settlement in 
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Australia, immigrants still compare their current situation with the one they had in 
their former country. Indeed, their self assessment would be a rather good 
estimate of the actual objective job quality difference when it is measured as a 
comparison to the former country. The relative optimism of the university 
graduates with regards to their job quality is matched with that of individuals 
having completed a technical qualification. The latter report higher self assessed 
job quality compared to the objective measures used in the estimations. Like for 
university graduates, the discrepancy between objective and subjective assessment 
of job quality is significant. The main difference between the two categories of 
individuals is that being a technician actually leads to higher job quality from the 
start. Other types of education are found to be little different from high school 
certificate in influencing immigrants’ job quality upon arrival. 
 The simple effect of cohort on job quality is not clear (variable Cohort). For 
models 2, 3, and 4, the marginal effects are not significant while it is positive in 
model 1 and negative in model 5. Hence, straight on arrival second cohort 
migrants do not seem to get significantly different quality jobs. Yet, given that the 
negative marginal effect is obtain for the subjective comparison between the last 
job held in the former country and the current main job in Australia, the result 
suggests second cohort migrants have a tendency to be less satisfied of their 
outcome in Australia. This does not mean that the jobs obtained are of lower 
quality, especially given the positive marginal effect obtained in the first model. 
Since second cohort migrants had to face tougher selection criteria and knew 
about them before migrating, it is possible that this cohort of migrants are 
intrinsically more motivated than past migrants, hence likely to be more 
disappointed with their first labour market outcome than others. It is the most 
plausible explanation for the sign difference obtained between objective and 
subjective definitions, and that is also compatible with the hypothesis that second 
cohort migrants are of better quality. This does not contradict the results of our 
previous study  (Junankar and Mahuteau, 2005). It only indicates that most of the 
difference between first and second cohort migrants lies on the variables which 
are interacted with cohort, namely time and channel of information on jobs. 
 As regards the direct effect of time on immigrants’ ability to find good jobs, 
we observe a negative quadratic relationship, that is the probability to find a good 
job is at first decreasing, reaches a minimum, and recovery occurs. We observe 
this pattern for all models. However, when investigating whether there is a cohort 
effect related to time (interaction variable), we observe significant differences 
between the two types of measures of job quality. Models involving objective 
definitions (with the exception of model 3) show a further negative effect of time 
for second cohort migrants. This result corroborates our hypothesis that after the 
policy change, new migrants have experienced delayed upward occupational 
mobility compared to previous migrants. As mentioned above, we did not really 
expect models based on subjective definitions to give the same result as the added 
pressure on second cohort migrants may have altered their perception of what 
constitutes a good job. Given the new two years waiting period before access to 
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social security benefits, some migrants may be grateful enough to have been able 
to find a job and would then be more likely to consider it a good job. 
 A rather surprising result is obtained for the interaction between time and 
cohort for model 3. Indeed, contrary to the first two objective definitions, we 
obtain a positive marginal effect associated with being a second cohort migrant. 
This result suggests that second cohort migrants obtain better jobs than first cohort 
individuals when the comparison is made with the last job held in their former 
country but seem to fare worse than first cohort migrants when attention is 
focused on the progression inside Australia. This effect is partly due to the fact 
that a larger proportion of second cohort migrants shift from salaried activities as 
their first job to self employment. As model 3 is based on the social ranking of 
activities (based on the ANU_3 classification), this type of shift may very well be 
associated with a downward move on the socioeconomic ladder. 
 As mentioned in Section 4, we are mainly interested in the probability for 
migrants to obtain good jobs conditioned on their ability to find a job (see 
equation (6)) since we have found the latter to be endogenous. Hence, any 
variable in the selection equation has an indirect effect on the good job 
probability. Since the time variables are present in both equations, they produce 
both a direct and indirect effect on the probability to find a good job. The latter 
can be related to migrants’ intrinsic quality as regards employability. So far we 
have only discussed the direct effect of time that is we have analysed differences 
between first and second cohort holding migrants’ quality constant. We now relax 
this assumption and interpret the total effects of time and cohort on the 
conditional probability to find a good job.  
 In order to make the results more intelligible, we used the marginal effects 
obtained for the time variables (time, time squared, interaction time, and cohort) 
and conducted simulations of the total effect (indirect and direct effects) of time 
on the probabilities. Since the marginal effects in the tables are given for the 
sample means, we had to recalculate the slope coefficients for the different 
intervals of time considered in order to have a better picture of the time effect on 
the probabilities. The results are summarized in Figure 1 to Figure 5 in the 
Appendices. The total relationship between time and probabilities for time beyond 
two years after settlement was obtained by applying the in-sample marginal 
effects to out-of-sample time periods. Therefore, these simulations must only be 
taken as an illustration of the pattern of the probabilities with time; they are only a 
rough approximation of the actual, unknown and unobservable, probability paths. 
Yet, these simulations are informative and enable us to give a comprehensible 
outlook of the differences between first and second cohort migrants.  
 When we focus on the first two objective definitions, that is, when we 
compare occupations (and socioeconomic ranking) throughout the migrants’ stay 
in Australia, we observe that the total effect of time on migrants’ ability to land a 
good job gives the advantage to second cohort migrants up to about a year and a 
half after settlement. Later on, first cohort migrants are more likely to be observed 
as having a good job than more recent migrants. The initial advantage observed 
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for second cohort migrants is mainly due to their higher ability to find jobs upon 
settlement (indirect effect). The models based on subjective definitions, however, 
give the advantage to second cohort migrants with no obvious faster recovery for 
first cohort migrants. Part of this result may be due, as already stated, to second 
cohort migrants being more likely to be satisfied with whatever job they find 
given the increased financial pressure they are subjected to. Altogether though, it 
is probably safer to give more credit to the results obtained on objective 
definitions regarding the effect of time on job quality reached by either cohort of 
migrants. 
 Regarding the effect of the job search method used by migrants to find a 
job, the use of the bivariate structure in our estimation enables us to decompose 
the total effect into the direct effect on job quality and the indirect on the 
probability to have a job.  
 Looking at the direct effects, we observe that any information channel other 
than ‘English speaking press’ (reference category) has a negative effect on job 
quality whatever the definition. The relatively large negative marginal effect 
obtained for sponsor is mainly due to the fact that we were not able to distinguish 
between types of sponsors. Had we been able to do so, we would have found 
different marginal effects between sponsors related to family reunion, spouse visa 
categories and actual professional sponsors. For the latter category, employers are 
required to prove their inability to find the skills they need on the Australian 
labour market in order to be able to successfully nominate a migrant. Therefore 
this type of sponsor would probably be associated to higher job quality. As for 
family reunion sponsors, the requirement is that they must be able to financially 
support the migrant after settlement, should she experience difficulties to sustain 
themselves. This type of sponsorship is definitely not informative of the type of 
job sponsors would be likely to recommend to the migrants.  
 The negative direct effect obtained for ‘ethnic press’ suggests that jobs 
obtained via ethnic networks are of a lower average quality than jobs obtained via 
traditional, native, channels. This is corroborated by the same negative values 
obtained for ‘family’ and ‘friends’. However, information gathered from friends 
appears to have a less negative influence on job quality than family and ethnic 
press. This difference is statistically significant for all models (except model 5). 
Information from friends is probably more purposively sought for by migrants, 
hence an increased probability that this information converts into a good job. A 
similar idea can be found in Yamauchi and Tanabe (2006) who explain the 
relative success of regional migrants in Thailand by the number and type of 
individuals they are in contact with and their relative success on the labour 
market. In their model, the information given by unemployed people is of lower 
quality and have poorer informative value (larger variance) than that obtained 
from already employed people. The difference we observe between friends and 
family may allow us to generalize this idea to job quality and suggest that family 
conveys lower quality information than friends about available jobs. The latter 
would logically be solicited if they already have a job that the migrant considers 
desirable to apply for. They are more likely to be better informed about job 
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vacancies and may also provide referrals (Montgomery 1991) so that the variance 
of the signal they generate towards new migrants is probably smaller than that of 
families taken in a broader sense. 
 Migrants obtaining their job through government agencies are significantly 
worse off than those who use the alternative formal job search method, namely 
Australian press. However, the negative effect is significantly smaller than that of 
other, informal, sources of information. This result is certainly due to the fact that 
migrants using this channel of information are a more selected group than the bulk 
of other migrants in so much as their skills and education must be matching those 
that are advertised by the Department of Immigration as being sought for in 
Australia. 
 The comparison between the two broad categories of good job definitions is 
informative as regards the effects of the channels of information. Indeed, looking 
at the marginal effects of model 1 and 2 compared to model 4, that is, for models 
focusing on migrants’ improvements once in Australia, we observe statistically 
larger values for objective definitions. In other words, whatever the channel of 
information used to find a job, migrants seem more pessimistic than necessary 
about the situation their job search method lead them to. Yet, looking at models 
focusing on comparisons with the former country of residence, we obtain the 
reverse effect, that is, migrants are worse off compared to their initial situation in 
their former country than they actually are ready to admit. This result may be 
indicative that migrants are somewhat disappointed with the help they received 
from their source in their later achievements in Australia. 
 When we focus on the effect of the information channels on the second 
cohort migrants (interaction variables), the results display some sensitivity to the 
various good job definitions. For instance, the marginal effect of government 
agencies is not significant for the first two models while it is in the other models. 
When significant, the marginal effect is negative which implies that second cohort 
migrants using this channel of information are on average worse off. The fact that 
the marginal effect of this interaction term is significant for model 3 but not for 
the two previous models, suggests that most of the difference between cohort 2 
and cohort 1 migrants who use this channel comes from the comparison with the 
former country of residence and not from the progression after arrival. Hence, the 
role of government agencies has not significantly changed since 1996 when we 
focus on job quality. Only second cohort migrants’ perception has in a negative 
way. 
 Second cohort migrants who have used their sponsors as a source of 
information about their current main job are better off in terms of occupation 
ranking (model 1) but, strangely, not in terms of socioeconomic ranking (model 2) 
nor in any other way job quality may be measured, even subjectively. This 
suggests that the improvement in terms of occupation is so marginal that it is not 
captured by the alternative ANU3 scale. 
 Turning to the effect of family and friends on second cohort migrants’ 
outcome, we notice that the latter improve their probability of having a good job 
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by respectively 7 percent and 3 percent by using this source. These informal 
channels have been slightly more efficient in enabling second cohort migrants to 
find a good job, even though they still provide individuals with a disadvantage 
compared to formal channels (indirect effect). Once more, for this job search 
method, there exists a discrepancy between migrants’ perception of job quality 
and the reality. Looking at the improvements once in Australia and comparing 
model 1 or 2 with model 3, we observe that the marginal effects in model 3 are 
only about half of that of model 1 and 2 for friends and family interaction terms. 
This difference is significant. Hence, second cohort migrants only credit family 
and friends for half of their actual contribution in finding a good job. However, 
when the focus is on comparisons between former country and current main job in 
Australia, second cohort migrants seem to give them more credit than necessary 
for the negative shock observed. 
 Finally, the estimations show that English proficiency certainly does not 
help finding a good job in the early stages of settlement in Australia. When 
compared with individuals with limited English abilities, individuals with very 
good and good English fluency fare worse up to 10 percent. Like education, early 
on after arrival, English proficiency is not of such a great help for migrants as they 
lack the relevant information and characteristics for them to compete effectively 
against natives on the labour market. At the same time, less educated and 
proficient migrants are more suited to the jobs where a larger concentration of 
migrants is usually found. This explains the somewhat counterintuitive effect of 
English abilities upon arrival in Australia. Yet, as one usually observes for 
education, we can expect English fluency to pay off in later jobs. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper we have studied the probability of new migrants of finding a 
“good job” using data from two cohorts of the Longitudinal Surveys of 
Immigrants to Australia. We studied whether the changes in the social security 
support for the second cohort led to a change in the probabilities of both getting a 
job and a good job. More importantly we focused on the effect of time on those 
probabilities and investigated whether second cohort migrants were able to 
recover significantly faster from their initial occupational drop on arrival. 
  We define a “good job” both objectively and subjectively: a good job in our 
objective definition is based on the classification and the social status of the 
occupation (ASCO2 and ANU scale) and the subjective definition relies on the 
migrants’ satisfaction with their job and whether they intend to search for another. 
We have used bivariate probit estimation methods so that the probability of 
finding a good job is conditioned by the probability of finding a job. In this study 
we further extended our previous research (Junankar and Mahuteau, 2005) by 
studying the role of ethnic networks in migrants’ job search using all the waves in 
the LSIA for the two cohorts.  
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 Our results show that the second cohort migrants have a higher probability 
of getting both a job and a good job. They are more likely to move upward earlier 
than first cohort migrants (total effect). However, a large part of this result is due 
to the higher employability of second cohort migrants (indirect effects). As a 
consequence, they outperform first cohort migrants but only up to about a year 
and half after settlement. After this, cohort 2 migrants who have not found a good 
job yet see their prospect of improving their situation decrease sharply below that 
of first cohort individuals. 
Finally, we find that the different search methods lead to different results: 
informal job search methods lead to lower job quality but the second cohort 
migrants seem to use this channel more efficiently.  
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Table 1. Estimations of the probability to obtain a good job (objective 
 definitions), Decomposition of the marginal effects. 
 
Model 1: 
Socio economic 
ranking definition of 
goog job (progression 
in Australia) 
Model 2: 
ASCO 2 digits 
definition of good job 
(progression in 
Australia) 
Model  3: 
Socio economic 
ranking definition of 
good job 
(progression from 
former country) 
Variable 
Job(Y2) Good Job(Y1) Job(Y2) 
Good 
Job(Y1) Job(Y2) 
Good 
Job(Y1) 
Age rescaled (/100) 1.8206*** (0.5929)  
1.7848*** 
(0.5971)  
1.8565*** 
(0.5803)  
Age squared rescaled -2.8173***(0.8104)  
-2.7772***
(0.8153)  
-2.9103*** 
(0.7921)  
Married -0.0395***(0.0131) 
0.014** 
(0.0061) 
-0.0418***
(0.0132) 
0.0108* 
(0.0062) 
-0.0336*** 
(0.0123) 
0.0114* 
(0.0059) 
Female -0.1525***(0.0137) 
0.0518*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.155*** 
(0.0137) 
0.0547*** 
(0.0061) 
-0.1402*** 
(0.0136) 
0.0327*** 
(0.0058) 
Non English speaking background -0.0708** (0.0331)  
-0.0649* 
(0.0341)  
-0.0992*** 
(0.0339)  
Education variables (highest level completed):      
University degree (bachelor or more) 0.0592*** (0.0161) 
-0.0462***
(0.0071) 
0.0617*** 
(0.0162) 
-0.046*** 
(0.0073) 
0.0491*** 
(0.0147) 
-0.0286***
(0.0069) 
Trade qualification 0.0276 (0.0263) 
-0.0035 
(0.0101) 
0.0304 
(0.0266) 
-0.0056 
(0.0104) 
0.0233 
(0.0255) 
-0.0165* 
(0.0096) 
Technician qualification -0.0247* (0.0145) 
0.0154** 
(0.0069) 
-0.0239 
(0.0147) 
0.0168** 
(0.0070) 
-0.0237* 
(0.0134) 
0.0131** 
(0.0065) 
Primary school -0.0742 (0.0477)  
-0.0706 
(0.0446)  
-0.0709 
(0.0451)  
Cohort 0.0601*** (0.0144) 
0.0288* 
(0.0167) 
0.0594*** 
(0.0146) 
0.0236 
(0.0168) 
0.0561*** 
(0.0137) 
-0.0036 
(0.0159) 
Spent some time in Australia before migration 0.0971*** (0.0131)  
0.0983*** 
(0.0130)  
0.0965*** 
(0.0126)  
Time since settlement (rescaled) 0.5637*** (0.0674) 
-0.1226***
(0.0362) 
0.5704*** 
(0.0676) 
-0.1082*** 
(0.0365) 
0.5273*** 
(0.0649) 
-0.1336***
(0.0337) 
Time since settlement squared (rescaled) -0.2712***(0.0434) 
0.0389* 
(0.0240) 
-0.2727***
(0.0436) 
0.0271* 
(0.0242) 
-0.2576*** 
(0.0413) 
0.0774*** 
(0.0223) 
Salary earner or business owner in former country 0.0934*** (0.0205)  
0.0893*** 
(0.0207)  
0.0864*** 
(0.0196)  
Business visa 0.2466*** (0.0328)  
0.2516*** 
(0.0328)  
0.2381*** 
(0.0319)  
Family visa 0.1783*** (0.0244)  
0.1814*** 
(0.0244)  
0.1776*** 
(0.0243)  
Independent visa 0.2744*** (0.0288)  
0.2731*** 
(0.0286)  
0.2699*** 
(0.0288)  
Channel of information on job (reference is Australian press):     
Ethnic press 0.7532*** (0.0602) 
-0.2351***
(0.0239) 
0.7607*** 
(0.0599) 
-0.253*** 
(0.0251) 
0.685*** 
(0.0584) 
-0.2449***
(0.0228) 
Sponsor 0.8117*** (0.0565) 
-0.3025***
(0.0259) 
0.831*** 
(0.0558) 
-0.2977*** 
(0.0262) 
0.7321*** 
(0.0562) 
-0.1742***
(0.0228) 
Government  0.9563*** (0.0616) 
-0.1552***
(0.0167) 
0.973*** 
(0.0608) 
-0.1551*** 
(0.0169) 
0.8816*** 
(0.0632) 
-0.111*** 
(0.0155) 
Private agency 0.8599*** (0.0520) 
-0.2396***
(0.0191) 
0.87*** 
(0.0516) 
-0.2574*** 
(0.0199) 
0.7984*** 
(0.0531) 
-0.2245***
(0.0182) 
Family 0.7887*** (0.0404) 
-0.2381***
(0.0132) 
0.8006*** 
(0.0393) 
-0.2546*** 
(0.0135) 
0.726*** 
(0.0425) 
-0.2*** 
(0.0116) 
Friend 0.7632*** (0.0368) 
-0.188*** 
(0.0110) 
0.7732*** 
(0.0355) 
-0.1992*** 
(0.0113) 
0.6997*** 
(0.0397) 
-0.1551***
(0.0099) 
Self 0.7625*** (0.0367) 
-0.252*** 
(0.0110) 
0.7747*** 
(0.0355) 
-0.267*** 
(0.0114) 
0.6982*** 
(0.0400) 
-0.2163***
(0.0098) 
Other 0.6067*** (0.0512) 
-0.2563***
(0.0241) 
0.6145*** 
(0.0506) 
-0.25*** 
(0.0243) 
0.5528*** 
(0.0514) 
-0.2577***
(0.0238) 
Number of person in household  0.0049*** (0.0018)  
0.0049*** 
(0.0018)  
0.0055*** 
(0.0018) 
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Interaction time cohort  -0.1773***(0.0317)  
-0.1598*** 
(0.0318)  
0.2533*** 
(0.0317) 
Very good English fluency  -0.0989***(0.0083)  
-0.1041*** 
(0.0085)  
-0.0811***
(0.0081) 
Good English Fluency  -0.0553***(0.0074)  
-0.0615*** 
(0.0075)  
-0.0404***
(0.0073) 
Cannot speak English  -0.0024 (0.0182)  
-0.0077 
(0.0186)  
0.0078 
(0.0189) 
Interaction Channel of information on job and Cohort:      
Ethnic press cohort2  0.012 (0.0387)  
0.0472 
(0.0396)  
0.0374 
(0.0401) 
Sponsor cohort2  0.078** (0.0386)  
0.0638 
(0.0398)  
-0.0387 
(0.0350) 
Government cohort2  -0.0031 (0.0330)  
-0.0054 
(0.0336)  
-0.0763** 
(0.0367) 
Private agency cohort2  0.0159 (0.0260)  
0.0262 
(0.0263)  
-0.029 
(0.0255) 
Family cohort2  0.0716*** (0.0199)  
0.0684*** 
(0.0198)  
0.056*** 
(0.0212) 
Friend cohort2  0.031** (0.0158)  
0.0444*** 
(0.0160)  
-0.0364** 
(0.0164) 
Self cohort2  0.0074 (0.0162)  
0.0034 
(0.0164)  
-0.038** 
(0.0160) 
Other cohort2  0.0535* (0.0318)  
0.0231 
(0.0327)  
0.0043 
(0.0315) 
ρ  Estimate of the correlation between 
disturbances: ρσ  
0.6385*** 
0.0174 
0.6465*** 
0.0169 
0.6283*** 
0.0174 
Number of observations: 10411 10411 4595 
Likelihood: -6935.127 -6967.727 -2891.083 
 
Note: *** p< 0.01, ** 0.01 ≤p < 0.05, * 0.05 ≤p < 0.10  
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Table 2. Estimations of the probability to obtain a good job (subjective 
 definitions), decomposition of the marginal effects. 
 
Model 4: 
Subjective definition 1: 
Satisfaction on current main job
Model 5: 
Subjective definition 2: 
Comparison satisfaction on 
current main job and 
occupation in former country 
Variable 
Job(Y2) Good Job(Y1) Job(Y2) Good Job(Y1) 
Age rescaled (/100) 2.0119*** (0.6127)  
1.6726*** 
(0.5662)  
Age squared rescaled -3.1288*** (0.8348)  
-2.6916*** 
(0.7724)  
Married -0.0388*** (0.0137) 
0.0162*** 
(0.0062) 
-0.038*** 
(0.0124) 
0.0098* 
(0.0057) 
Female -0.1588*** (0.0142) 
0.0432*** 
(0.0062) 
-0.1412*** 
(0.0136) 
0.0766*** 
(0.0061) 
Non English speaking background -0.0835** (0.0419)  
-0.0454 
(0.0307)  
Education variables (highest level completed):     
University degree (bachelor or more) 0.056*** (0.0165) 
-0.0225*** 
(0.0072) 
0.0456*** 
(0.0145) 
-0.0347*** 
(0.0069) 
Trade qualification 0.0434 (0.0278) 
0.0121 
(0.0106) 
0.0304 
(0.0240) 
0.0099 
(0.0099) 
Technician qualification -0.0208 (0.0147) 
0.0317*** 
(0.0072) 
-0.0222* 
(0.0129) 
0.0131** 
(0.0066) 
Primary school -0.0587 (0.0451)  
-0.0661 
(0.0507)  
Cohort 0.0599*** (0.0155) 
0.0068 
(0.0166) 
0.0504*** 
(0.0142) 
-0.0316** 
(0.0155) 
Spent some time in Australia before migration 0.1102*** (0.0135)  
0.1207*** 
(0.0131)  
Time since settlement (rescaled) 0.5838*** (0.0683) 
-0.1851*** 
(0.0365) 
0.5331*** 
(0.0652) 
-0.1126*** 
(0.0359) 
Time since settlement squared (rescaled) -0.28*** (0.0443) 
0.0958*** 
(0.0241) 
-0.2573*** 
(0.0408) 
0.0628*** 
(0.0240) 
Salary earner or business owner in former country 0.0693*** (0.0218)  
0.0926*** 
(0.0204)  
Business visa 0.2835*** (0.0345)  
0.2664*** 
(0.0332)  
Family visa 0.2008*** (0.0256)  
0.1781*** 
(0.0243)  
Independent visa 0.3119*** (0.0302)  
0.2738*** 
(0.0296)  
Channel of information on job (reference is Australian press):   
Ethnic press 0.764*** (0.0614) 
-0.297*** 
(0.0257) 
0.6683*** 
(0.0604) 
-0.1555*** 
(0.0251) 
Sponsor 0.8398*** (0.0578) 
-0.326*** 
(0.0272) 
0.7376*** 
(0.0576) 
-0.1774*** 
(0.0231) 
Government  0.9879*** (0.0642) 
-0.1932*** 
(0.0169) 
0.8836*** 
(0.0651) 
-0.1788*** 
(0.0154) 
Private agency 0.8928*** (0.0536) 
-0.2744*** 
(0.0206) 
0.7522*** 
(0.0564) 
-0.1725*** 
(0.0175) 
Family 0.8024*** (0.0414) 
-0.2923*** 
(0.0140) 
0.7242*** 
(0.0447) 
-0.1804*** 
(0.0120) 
Friend 0.7826*** (0.0376) 
-0.235*** 
(0.0118) 
0.694*** 
(0.0413) 
-0.1436*** 
(0.0102) 
Self 0.7814*** (0.0380) 
-0.2776*** 
(0.0118) 
0.6823*** 
(0.0418) 
-0.1489*** 
(0.0100) 
Other 0.6346*** (0.0532) 
-0.3331*** 
(0.0275) 
0.5561*** 
(0.0504) 
-0.1727*** 
(0.0227) 
Number of person in household  0.0036** (0.0018)  
-0.0044*** 
(0.0017) 
Interaction time cohort  0.0611* (0.0320)  
-0.0252 
(0.0300) 
Very good English fluency  -0.0993***  -0.0747*** 
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(0.0086) (0.0081) 
Good English Fluency  -0.0554*** (0.0077)  
-0.0523*** 
(0.0073) 
Cannot speak English  0.0031 (0.0191)  
0.0368* 
(0.0190) 
Interaction Channel of information on job and Cohort:    
Ethnic press cohort2  -0.0156 (0.0365)  
-0.0593 
(0.0362) 
Sponsor cohort2  0.0025 (0.0386)  
-0.027 
(0.0343) 
Government cohort2  -0.0967*** (0.0344)  
-0.1092*** 
(0.0311) 
Private agency cohort2  0.0498* (0.0270)  
-0.0632*** 
(0.0231) 
Family cohort2  0.0401** (0.0203)  
-0.0735*** 
(0.0186) 
Friend cohort2  0.0148 (0.0170)  
-0.1024*** 
(0.0154) 
Self cohort2  0.0072 (0.0171)  
-0.0958*** 
(0.0158) 
Other cohort2  0.0524 (0.0349)  
-0.0128 
(0.0333) 
ρ  Estimate of the correlation between 
disturbances: ρσ  
0.6008*** 
0.0191 
0.6336*** 
0.0185 
Number of observations: 10411 10411 
Likelihood -6333.537 -6921.162 
 
Note: *** p< 0.01, ** 0.01 ≤p < 0.05, * 0.05 ≤p < 0.10  
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Appendices: 
 
Figure 1: Total effect of time on the conditional probability to get 
a good job (objective definition, model 1), 
Figure 2: Total effect of time on the conditional probability to get 
a good job (objective definition, model 2) 
Figure 3: Total effect of time on the conditional probability to get 
a good job (objective definition, model 3) 
Figure 4: Total effect of time on the conditional probability to get 
a good job (subjective definition, model 4) 
 
Figure 5: Total effect of time on the conditional probability to get a 
good job (subjective definition, model 5) 
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